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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

CASEY NEAL SWEAT,

:

Case No. 20718

Defendant-Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam decision
filed by this Court on April 8, 1986.

Originally, this case was an

appeal from a guilty plea and conviction of burglary, a second
degree felony.

The defendant was sentenced in the Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable
John A. Rokich, Judge, to one to fifteen years imprisonment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 1-2.

ARGUMENT
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Sweat, 31 Utah Adv.
Rep. 29 (filed April 8, 1986), this Court has either overlooked or
misapprehended the main contention advanced by Appellant's Brief.
In this case, the Appellant, Casey Sweat, pleaded guilty to
burglary, a second degree felony.

A ninety-day diagnostic

evaluation of Mr. Sweat was ordered prior to sentencing.

The report

prepared subsequent to that evaluation included uncorroborated
statements that the defendant sexually assaulted the burglary
victim.

The allegations of sexual misconduct were never charged and

were denied by Mr. Sweat (T. 2-3). The trial court sentenced the
defendant on the basis of the report (T. 7 ) . On appeal, Mr. Sweat
contested the inclusion of the unsubstantiated allegations in the
report which formed the basis for the judgefs sentencing decision.
The opinion in this case states:

"There is no clear

indication in the record that defendant's sentence was based on the
alleged sexual misconduct.
statement.

In fact, the record undermines this

Just before imposing sentence, the trial judge stated:

THE COURT: Well, taking all of the
considerations, taking everything into
consideration I don't see any legal reason why
sentencing cannot be imposed at this time.
Therefore, I'm going to impose sentence as
follows: . . .
(T. 7)
The district court relied on the entire 90 day
evaluation/presentence report in imposing sentence.

That reliance

resulted in prejudice to Mr. Sweat.
The presentence report investigator recommended commitment
to the Utah State Prison.

(Appellant's Brief, Addendum A at 9 ) .

Immediately preceeding this recommendation is a discussion of the
defendant's "sexual attacks upon the elderly woman."

^Id.

On the

other hand, a psychologist, who had no knowledge of the sexual
misconduct allegations, recommended that the defendant be placed in
a substance abuse treatment facility.

(Appellant's Brief, Addendum

D at 2 ) . Clearly, the judge's reliance on the erroneous allegations
led him to the conclusion of the presentence report investigator
- 2

-

rather than the conclusion of the psychologist.

The Appellant was

obviously harmed by such a conclusion.
The per curiam opinion in this case states that "so long as
basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural
fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in
considering

f

any and all information that reasonably may bear on the

proper sentence.f"

J^d.

(citations omitted).

In other words,

sentencing proceedings are subject to the requirements of due
process.

However, the process in this case violated one of the most

fundamental tenets of due process which the opinion completely
ignored.
A criminal defendant may not be convicted of a crime for
which he is not charged.

Indeed, this principle was recognized by

the Supreme Court in Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
The Court stated, "[i]t is as much a violation of due process to
send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which
he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that
was never made."

See, also, Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100

(1979); Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); and State v. Martin,
679 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1984) .
The Utah Constitution sets out certain rights of the
accused in criminal prosecutions.

Article I, Section 12 states:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof . . .
Further, Article I, Section 13 states:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information
after examination and commitment by a magistrate

No person can be tried and punished without first being charged.

In

this case, the trial judge determined punishment for the defendant
after considering uncharged, unsubstantiated allegations.

This is

clearly at odds with any notion of due process.
In his opening brief, the Appellant contended that an
accused is entitled to have a judge rely on accurate information in
imposing sentence.

(Appellant's Brief at 4)

Indeed, in State v.

Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980), this Court stated:

"The

fair administration of justice at the least requires that the
information upon which the judge relies in imposing punishment is
accurate."

This position was reaffirmed in State v. Howell, 707

P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985), in which this Court stated:

"The due

process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
requires that sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence."
Any sentence which is based, in part, on unreliable information must
be remanded.

United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2nd Cir.

1973); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971); State
v. Gibson, 681 P.2d 1 (Idaho App. 1984).
In this case, the presentence report contained allegations
of significant sexual misconduct on the part of Mr. Sweat.

However,

the allegations were in the form of unsubstantiated, second hand
reports from the victim who took several days to report the alleged
sexual misconduct.

The allegations were apparently insufficient to

support the instigation of criminal charges.
5-7).

(Appellant's Brief at

Such unsubstantiated claims are far from the "accurate

information" envisioned by Lipsky and Howell.

Sentencing in felony cases in this state can result in the
second-most severe penalty that a state can impose—deprivation of
an individual's liberty for a significant length of time.
penalty of death is more severe.

Only the

In light of the severity of the

penalty, the issue in this case is simple:

Should this Court

require a sentencing judge to act only on information that is
accurate, reliable, and trustworthy?

The alternative is to allow a

judge to impose sentence based on innuendo, rumor, and falsehood.
To allow the latter would gut the notion of due process at the
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.

CONCLUSION
Because this court either misapprehended or overlooked
appellant's primary contention in its decision in this case, the
appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider that
decision and reverse and remand his sentence for redetermination.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^

day of April, 1986.

CURTIS C. NESSET^
Attorney for Petitioner
I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, this

day of April, 1986.

CERTIFICATION
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this

case and;
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this 22

day of April, 1986*

CURTIS C. NESSET ^
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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